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I. INTRODUCTION 
In their response, the Defendants argue that the underwriting scheme at issue in this case 
is acceptable despite the statutory requirements because the potential hurdles to coverage are 
disclosed to the clients through various documents. To make this argument, they must tum a 
blind eye to the statutes requiring that the insurance begin when the indebtedness is incurred and 
that certain underwriting requirements are not permissible in this state. Further, the Defendants 
attempt to limit Mr. Shapley's other claims through ancillary issues that do not apply to the 
circumstances of this appeal. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment because Idaho 
Code § 41-2307 requires the policy at issue in this case to commence simultaneously with the 
indebtedness. To find otherwise renders that statute meaningless and allows insurers the best of 
both worlds collecting unearned premiums or avoiding losses when they delay their 
underwriting. Further, Mr. Shapley should have been permitted to amend his complaint to 
include a claim for estoppel as the Defendants changed their position to their benefit following 
Barbara Shapley's death. Finally, a jury should be allowed to determine whether the Defendants 
were negligent in procuring the policy at issue in this case. As such summary judgment was 
inappropriate on all of Plaintiff s claims. 
II. ARGUMENTS IN REPLY 
A. DEFENDANTS CONTINUE TO IGNORE THE REQUIREMENT TO 
BEGIN COVERAGE SIMUL TANEOUSL Y WITH THE INDEBTEDNESS 
In reply, Defendants argue that the controlling statutes allow for delayed underwriting and 
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collection of unearned premium when the application is eventually accepted. In making these 
arguments, they take several liberties with statutory interpretation and the facts of the case. The 
Plaintiff maintains that the statute must be interpreted to mean that inception of the policy and 
the indebtedness begin simultaneously. If a delay occurs, the insurer must bear the risk of a loss 
occurring during the delay. 
I. Section 41-2307 requires the credit life policy to be effective at the 
time the debt is incurred 
The language of § 41-2307 is clear, "The term of any credit life insurance or credit 
disability insurance shall, subject to acceptance by the insurer, commence on the date when the 
debtor becomes obligated to the creditor ... " The purpose of this requirement is meant to satisfy 
the debt should a debtor die with outstanding debt. "Credit life insurance is designed to satisfy 
the insured's indebtedness upon his or her death. Therefore, the amount of the policy may be 
limited to the amount of the outstanding indebtedness ... " 12 Couch on Ins. § 179: 11. "Credit life 
insurance, as between the creditor and insured debtor, is collateral security." Hatley v. Johnston, 
265 N.C. 73,83, 143 S.E.2d 260, 268 (1965). "Celiainly an insured has an insurable interest in 
his own life, and so does a creditor of the insured to the extent of an indebtedness on a credit life 
insurance certificate or policy." Leuning v. Hill, 79 Wash. 2d 396, 402, 486 P.2d 87, 90 (1971). 
The entire purpose of this special type of insurance is to protect the creditor and the debtor in the 
event the passes away and can no longer pay of I the loan. In this particular case, Wells Fargo was 
insuring itself against a loss as Centurion was a wholly-owned subsidiary of Wells Fargo and all 
Centurion employees were Wells Fargo employees. (R. Vol. 1, p.I20) 
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The Defendants argue that this requirement should be diminished to allow for 
underwriting on their own schedule. To support their argument, Defendants point to their 
requirement of a telephonic interview with the Shapleys before the application could be 
approved. (Respondents' Br. at 12) The interview, they argue, is essential to acceptance of the 
application. However, the need for the interview was not a statutory requirement and was only 
suggested in the application that it might be necessary. (R. Vol. 2, p.211) In fact, Defendants did 
not take any steps to complete underwriting until after the claim was submitted at the 
Defendants' agent's suggestion following Barbara Shapley's death. (R. Vol. 1, pp. 128, 172-73) 
To call the interview a "requirement" is a misleading notion. Rather, the interview is the 
Defendants' internally-created hurdle. The requirement is only applied if the company's 
"underwriter may first need additional information from [the applicant] ... " (R. Vol. 2, p. 211) 
(emphasis added) The insureds are never informed of the requirement unless the interviewer calls 
for the interview. "If so, we (or our representative) will contact you by telephone to obtain the 
information we need to make our decision. If we require a telephone interview and the 
interview is not completed for any reason we will not approve the insurance coverage(s) you 
requested." (Jd.) (emphasis added) What makes the company's underwriting practices in the case 
even more problematic is that the interview cannot be used for underwriting purposes. "No 
statement made by a debtor shall be used by the insurer as a basis for denying eligibility for 
coverage unless such a statement is contained in a written application for insurance signed by the 
debtor." (IDAPA 18.01.61.11.14) Thus, the Defendants are limited to the written application, 
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including the "Health Statement" to determine eligibility for this insurance. 
If approved, this protocol of delayed underwriting allows insurers to avoid the 
requirement that the policy begin when the loan closes. This defeats the purpose of credit life 
Insurance paying off the debt should a loss occur during the life of the loan. 
II. If the insurer delays underwriting, it must bear the risk of a loss 
occurring during a period of temporary insurance or conditional 
receipt 
Plaintiffs are not arguing that credit life insurers are required to accept all comers. 
However, if the insurer delays the underwriting process until after the indebtedness begins, the 
insurer must bear the risk of a loss occurring during the underwriting period. To find otherwise, 
gifts the insurer a win-win scenario. If it delays underwriting, but eventually approves the 
application, the insurer receives premium from the commencement of the policy even though it 
had no risk during that period (the date of indebtedness to the acceptance date). The alternative is 
that the insurer becomes notified of a loss during the delayed underwriting period and simply 
stops underwriting and denies the claim because underwriting was not completed. The latter is 
what occurred in this case. 
The temporary insurance doctrine protects insureds in this scenario. The Shapleys had not 
received a conditional premium receipt as occurs in more typical insurance transactions (see 
Toevs v. Western Farm Bureau Lf{e Ins. Co., 94 Idaho 151,483 P.2d 682 (1971)), however, they 
agreed to the premium to be paid as part of their monthly payment to the Defendants. (R Vo!.l, 
pp 110-112) Barbara Shapley answered "No" to each question on the Health Statement. (R Vol. 
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1, p. 112) There is no dispute as to her insurability. Even the Defendants' agent believed that 
Mrs. Shapley was insured when he became aware of her death. (R. Vol. 1, p.l72) If the insurer is 
allowed to delay its underwriting until after the loan closes, the insurer must bear the risk of a 
loss occurring during that time. 
iii. Section 41-2308 allows for later delivery only if payment is separate 
from the loan payment 
Defendants argue that §41-2308 allows for delivery of the policy or certificate after the 
indebtedness commences. Subsection three states, "The individual policy or group certificate 
of insurance shall be delivered to the insured debtor at the time the indebtedness is 
incurred except as hereinafter provided." (emphasis added) To skirt this requirement, the 
Defendants rely on subsection four, which allows for later delivery if a separate payment for the 
insurance is made. To make this argument, Defendants take great libeliy with their interpretation 
of "separate payment." The Shapleys' premium was to be paid as a single, monthly payment 
included in their mortgage payment. (R. Vol. 1, p.ll 0) The joint payment required that the 
certificate of insurance be delivered to the Shapleys when they closed on their loan. 
iv. Rouse is not applicable to this appeal as the application in that case 
was rejected prior to the loss occurring 
The Defendants rely extensively on Rouse v. Household Finance Corp., 144 Idaho 68, 56 
P.3d 569 (2007), to support their argument that they are not required to insure from the 
commencement of the indebtedness. That case is clearly distinguishable from Mr. Shapley's case. 
Primarily, the statute at the crux of this appeal, Idaho Code §41-2307, is not even mentioned in 
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that case. FUlihermore, the contract claims in that case were based on a contract existing after the 
insurer had rejected the application for coverage. These two factors are tatal to the Defendants' 
analysis. Here, the central issue is that §41-2307 requires the policy to be in force when the 
indebtedness begins. Additionally, the Defendants never rejected Barbara Shapley's application. 
As such, Rouse is not applicable to this appeal and holds not precedential value to this issues 
presented to the Court. 
B. THE DEFENDANTS ARE ESTOPPED FROM CHANGING POSITIONS 
TO THEIR BENEFIT 
The Defendants opposition to Mr. Shapley's appeal on his claim for estoppel relies on 
factual disputes that should be left for the jury. Their only defense to the requested amendment is 
not for any legal reason. Rather, they only argue that Mr. Shapley's reliance on the policy's 
inception date could not be reasonable. Such is an inappropriate reason to deny the amendment. 
Whether a party's reliance was reasonable is a question of fact for the jury. Young v. State Farm 
Nfut. Auto. Ins. Co., 127 Idaho 122, 126,898 P.2d 53, 57 (1995). Regardless of the facts 
surrounding the application process and the issuance of the policy, ultimately the reasonableness 
of the insured's reliance is a question for the jury to decide. Shoup v. Union Sec. DIe Ins. Co., 
142 Idaho 152, 155, 124 P.3d 1028,1031 (2005). 
The Plaintiff appropriately brought the issues of his Motion to Amend before the District 
Court and this Court. The Defendants argue that the theory of quasi-estoppel is presented for the 
first time on appeal. (Respondents' Br. at 22) Simply put, this is not true. Estoppel in the 
insurance context is a quasi-estoppel doctrine. Insurance estoppel, unlike equitable estoppel, does 
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not require a misrepresentation by one party or actual reliance by the other. Keesee v. Fetzek, 111 
Idaho 360, 362, 723 P.2d 904, 906 (Ct.App.1986). A claim under this theory only requires 
reliance by the insured and whether the insurer profits from changing its position. Shoup, 142 
Idaho at 155, 124 at 1031. The doctrine "precludes a party from asserting, to another's 
disadvantage, a right inconsistent with a position previously taken by him." Keesee, 111 Idaho 
360,362, 723 P.2d 904, 906; citing KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279, 281, 486 P.2d 992, 
994 (1971). 
The Defendants in this matter allowed the Shapleys to believe that the commencement 
date of their insurance coincided with the indebtedness. A believe that is reasonable in light of 
the statutory requirements, the documents in the record, and the shared belief ofMr. Steve 
Ellison. Then when the company got word of a loss, it changed its position to benefit by avoiding 
payment of the death claim. Beyond that, the company then issued a policy, other than the one 
that had been applied for, to Mr. Shapley and collected his premiums each month. I Based on the 
facts in the record, Mr. Shapley should have been permitted to amend his complaint to include a 
claim for estoppel. 
C. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS INAPPROPRIATE ON MR. SHAPLEY'S 
NEGLIGENCE CLAIM 
Clearly, the Plaintiff's negligence claim is a secondary issue to the central issue of this 
appeal. However, the Plaintiff maintains that there are material issues of facts that prevented 
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summary judgment of his claim of negligence against the Defendants. 
i. The negligence claim is not dependant on a contract 
In their reply, Defendants do not dispute that Mr. Shapley's negligence claim is not 
dependant on the existence of a contract. A party can recover damages for negligence on the part 
of the party procuring the policy for errors in the issuance of the policy. See MeAlvain v. Gen. 
Ins. Co. of Am., 97 Idaho 777, 554 P.2d 955 (1976). Issues of negligence present questions of fact 
to be resolved by the jury. Deshazer v. Tompkins, 89 Idaho 347, 355,404 P.2d 604, 608 (1965). 
As such, it is undisputed that the District Court erred in granting summary judgment based on the 
existence of the insurance contract. 
ii. The economic loss rule does not apply 
The Defendants only other hope to prevent reversal of the judgment on the negligence 
claim is to argue that the economic loss rule prevents recovery in negligence. Judgment was 
never entered on this issue and it was not taken up on appeal because there was no judgment on 
the economic loss rule. (R. Vol. 2, pp. 302, 364) The Defendants were free to seek an amendment 
of the Judgment to the findings of the motion for reconsideration, but they did not do so. In fact 
the Judgment they submitted to the court specifically allowed for such amendments. (R. Vol. 2, 
pp. 303) As such, the economic loss rule issue may appropriately be before this Court since the 
Defendants raised the issue in reply. Certainly, the Plaintiff was not required to raise the issue in 
I The Shapleys applied for a Joint Life policy. (R. Vol. 1, p. 115) Following Barbara Shapley's 
death, the company issued a Single Life policy to Mr. Shapley after denying payment of the 
claim. (R. Vol. 1, p.137) 
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its opening brief. 
Regardless, the economic loss rule does not apply to this case. Idaho law recognizes a 
"special relationship" between the insurer and the insured and also recognizes that this 
relationship requires that "the parties deal with each other fairly, honestly, and in good faith .... " 
Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 125 Idaho 840, 843, 875 P.2d 937,940 (1994) (citing White v. 
Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 99, 730 P.2d 1014, 1019 (1986». The District Court's 
reliance on Vincent v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 136 Idaho 107,29 P.3d 943 (2001), is 
misplaced. That case did not determine whether insurers and insureds share a "special 
relationship," but rather, whether the company had a duty to verify the adequacy of insurance 
coverage. Id., 136 Idaho at 109,29 P.3d at 945. There were certainly material issues of fact that 
prevented summary judgment on that issue. 
Even without regard to the special exception issue in this case, it is unlikely that the 
economic loss rule should be applied in the context where an insurance professional and/or 
company errors in procuring coverage. This issue has not been before this Court; however, it has 
been decided in other jurisdictions. "We agree with the observations of those who have noted 
that because actions against professionals often involve purely economic loss without any 
accompanying personal injury or property damage, extending the economic loss rule to these 
cases would effectively extinguish such causes of action." Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 
973, 983 (Fla. 1999). It is unlikely that a claim regarding a loss that should be covered by a life 
insurance policy (or most insurance policies for that matter) would ever result in anything other 
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than purely economic loss. To apply the rule in this scenario would effectively do away with all 
claims resulting from the negligent procurement and/or underwriting of an insurance policy. 
The economic loss rule does not apply to this case. Even if the rule did apply, there were 
material issues of fact that prevented finding that no special relationship or other unique 
circumstances existed that would prevent application of the rule to Mr. Shapley's case. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The clear meaning of the statute governing credit life insurance requires that the policy 
begin at the commencement of the indebtedness. The Defendants have skirted that requirement 
by applying their own hurdles to coverage that they applied after learning of Barbara Shapley's 
death. The hurdles, like the underwriting interview, are not permissible underwriting 
requirements. As such, the Court should reverse summary judgment on all of Plaintiffs claims 
dependent on the existence of a contract. Further, Plaintiff should have been allowed to amend 
his complaint to include a claim of estoppel since he reasonably relied on the policy beginning 
with the debt and the defendants clearly benefitted from their change in position. Finally, 
Defendants only defense to reversal of the negligence is that the economic loss rule bars the 
claim. The rule does not apply in the insurance context. Even if it did, issues of fact prevented 
summary judgment on whether any exception to the rule applied. 
For the foregoing reasons, as well as all those contained in Plaintiffs Opening Brief, Mr. 
Shapley requests reversal of the Judgment entered in the District Court and the denial of his 
Motion to Amend the Complaint to include a claim for estoppel. 
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DATED this 2nd day of November, 2012. 
PEDERSEN and WHITEHEAD 
• 
BY-t_~--'7L--~-\-_____ ~--_-.-/_-_ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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